Evaluating Government Policy in Transition Countries by Max Gillman
1 1 5 5 6 6
Max Gillman
Evaluating Government Policy
in Transition Countries 
W W a a r r s s a a w w , , 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9Materials published here have a working paper character. They can be subject to further
publication. The views and opinions expressed here reflect Authors point of view and
not necessarily those of CASE. 
This paper was prepared for the research project  No. P 96-6089-R (ACE PHARE
Programme 1996) on "The Medium and Long-term Perspectives of Fiscal Adjustment of
Selected Central European Countries".
© CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw 1999
Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury
DTP: CeDeWu  Centrum Doradztwa i Wydawnictw Multi-Press sp. z o.o.
ISSN 1506-1701, ISBN 83-7178-111-3
Publisher: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research
ul. Sienkiewicza 12, 00-944 Warsaw, Poland 




2. Neoclassical Measures 7
3. A Measure of a Governments Debt-equity Ratio 12
4. Empirical Estimation of the Debt-equity Ratios 15
5. Evaluation of Changes in the Debt-equity Ratio 16
6. Qualifications and Conclusions 17
References 19Max Gillman
is an assistant professor in the Economics Department of Central European University.  He
writes on monetary economics and macroeconomics, with some applications to transition
countries.  He served as a fellow at the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education
 Economics Institute in Prague, the University of Melbourne, the University of New South
Wales, and the University of Otago, and served as aide for tax and social security legislation
in the U.S. House of representatives.
Max Gillman, Department of Economics, Central European University, Nador ut. 9, Budapest,
1051, Hungary; gillman@ceu.hu
4
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 156  Max GillmanAbstract
The paper examines neoclassical measures to evaluate government policy in transition
countries: 1) marginal factor prices and the return to capital, 2) growth rates and taxes, 3)
inflation rates, and 4) debt/GDP ratios, related to international real business cycle and
endogenous growth theory.  It further postulates a way to consider the debt/equity position
of the government, related to a risk-yield framework.  This gives a potentially more useful
indicator than the debt/GDP ratio alone.  Empirically these measures are examined in an
illustrative way for a set of Central European countries plus Germany and the US for
comparison, for the period of 1990-1998, using an internally standardized data set from the
on-line International Financial Statistics.
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A view of a governments macroeconomics policy versus what is known as
"microeconomic reform" is that the former shifts around the burden of the problem
while the latter solves the problem. In economic terms, if there is a distortion in
incentives, the first-best solution is to eliminate the distortion. Such macroeconomic
problems with microeconomic solutions may be a disincentive to work that raises
long-term unemployment because of moral hazards problems arising out of an
unemployment insurance system that subsidizes not working. Or it may be
incomplete insurance across states of nature because of a "free" national health care
system that induces substitution towards low-quality health care. Or it may be
incomplete consumption smoothing intergenerationally because of a government
pension/social security scheme that inefficiently creates moral hazard by inducing
early retirement. Or it may be incomplete smoothing of consumption
intertermporally because of a lack of integration into international capital markets,
because of unenforceable property rights, high and varying inflation rates, or high and
accelerating government debt.
Evaluating the government reform policies of the Central European nations, as
they seek integration in international markets, requires fresh examinations of what
role governments actually play in democratically-inclined societies: something beyond
the mix of monetary and fiscal policy within an IS-LM multiplier framework.
Intertemporal analysis over the horizon of optimal agents means:
(1) that with Ricardian equivalence between debt and taxes, there is no multiplier
from deficit spending.
(2) It means that with the Fisherian equation that sets the nominal interest rate
equal to the expected inflation rate plus the marginal product of capital, there is no
multiplier from printing money at a faster rate.
Rather than postulating multipliers from current period government spending,
optimization over time leaves us to examine how the government raises capital
intertemporally and how it invests its capital. And this is one way to think
of microeconomic reforms: how the government raises and spends capital and
controls freedom of economic, social and political exchange through regulations. How
do we examine the broad effect of policy through the sequences of incremental
reforms? Can we discern directions in which governments and the private sectors are
headed?
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Different ways to evaluate government policy have been used with neoclassical
methods that generally focus on the economys performance and only indirectly reflect
government action. Three categories of such measures are the (1) marginal factor
products, (2) tax and growth rates, and (3) debt ratios.
2.1. Marginal Factor Products
From an arbitrage-type perspective, with the integrated-market law of one price,
the real interest rate is itself a summary measure of how a developing country is
viewed. Computation of a real rate follows by assuming that the deterministic Fisher
equation of interest rates holds, and that the actual inflation rate equals the expected
inflation rate. This means that for countries in which the inflation rate has been
accelerating or decelerating unexpectedly, the ex post actual rate will not equal the ex
ante expected inflation rate and the ex post real rate cannot be computed this way.
And this problem is evident when the computed ex post real rate is a negative
quantity. In the Central European transition countries, such a computed negative real
rate is commonplace in countries with highly variable inflation rates.
One way to compute the real rate that minimizes this problem is to choose a
nominal interest rate that builds in a risk premium for inflation rate variance. This is
consistent with the generalized Fisher equation under uncertainty, which in certain
cases gives the nominal interest rate as the expected inflation rate plus the
deterministic real rate plus what has been called an inflation risk premium [Bogacheva,
1999; see Lucas and Stokey, 1987; Bansil and Coleman, 1996]. The governments
treasury debt interest rate generally may include some of this risk premium. But these
rates are more commonly thought of as the risk-free rate for the particular country,
and using this to compute a real interest rate aggravates the problem of finding
negative real rates, since the treasury debt rate is relatively low. In the on-line
International Financial Statistics, which supplies a degree of homogeneity across
national accounts, there is a "lending rate" which generally is the highest nominal
interest rate reported and one that would be more likely to include an inflation risk
premium. There are two consistently available inflation rate indicators, the consumer
price index and the producer price index. The producer price index (PPI) gives a
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PPI gives an upper bound on the real rate that can be reasonably well-compared
across countries.
Table 1 shows the real interest rate for the 1990s for several Central European
countries plus Germany and the United States for comparison. The Czech Republic
has had a low and steady real rate; Hungary has had a higher and more variable rate;
Poland has had a still higher and more variable rate; and Slovenia has had an even
higher rate as variable as Polands. This suggests that the higher average rates are
partly to compensate for greater variability. In Slovenia, there are numerous capital
controls that may cause the rate to be higher than say Polands, with equal variability.
The high rate in Germany and even higher rate in the US, both with equally low
variability, suggest a higher marginal product of capital than in the transition
countries.
Why would the marginal product of capital be higher in Western countries than in
transition countries? Convergence theory in the exogenous growth framework predicts
that countries with higher marginal products and the same technology will grow faster
as all countries converge to the same rate of growth of output, as capital flows to the
higher marginal product areas. However even with a scarcity of capital in developing
countries, capital will not flow into these countries if the human capital stock is low and
as a result the return on physical capital is actually lower than in the West. This is the
argument of Lucas (1989). This logic and Table 1 suggest that the stock of human capital
may be lower relative to the stock of physical capital in the above transition countries,
and so the return on physical capital is lower.
Alternatively, the degree to which the Hungarian, Polish, and Slovenian rates are
above the German rate may be for other reasons than a premium due to variability. For
example, (a) a lack of full integration in capital markets can result because of insufficient
domestic property right enforcement such as bankruptcy laws that lead to a low collateral
value on loaned capital. This conceivably can make the return to owners of capital low
because of leakage of capital to non-owners, perhaps as has been the Czech experience.
(b) With solid property rights, market segmentation can constrain investment to be
financed out of domestic savings, raising marginal products in transition countries such as
Hungary and Poland. (c) Similarly, government restrictions on capital flows can cause
segmentation that raises the marginal product of capital, perhaps as in Slovenia. (d) And
incentive-compatibility problems with debt repayments can decrease international capital
finance and increase marginal products, perhaps as in Romania, Ukraine, and Russia.
A related gauge of a countrys progress and relative ranking amongst nations is its
real wage, and how fast it rises. The rate of increase in the real wage is a rough
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rate of interest on physical capital. In equilibrium on the "balanced-growth" path, the
net rates return to human and physical capital should be equal. Taxes reduce the net
returns to both types of capital, and leisure can act as a tax on human capital that
decreases its net return. 
Table 2 shows the percent change in the real wage in the 1990s for several
Central European countries plus Germany and the US. The computation takes the
wage series in the International Financial Statistics and deflates it with the PPI, before
calculating the percentage change. It shows high rates of "return" to human capital in
Czech and Poland in recent years, of over 10%, compared to a US rate near 1%.
Compared to the real rate of interest on physical capital, the Czech human capital rate
is higher, the Polish rates were about the same in 1996, while the US growth rate in
wages was much below its return on physical capital.
The high rates for Czech and Poland support the notion of a scarcity of human capital
relative to physical capital there. Although it is well-known that Central European nations
have high literacy and attenuation rates, this general human capital is only a part of the
composition of human capital. The other is specific human capital from on-the-job
training and learning-by-doing, that comes most readily in industries building comparative
advantage in international markets. This is what presumably is at lower levels in Central
European human capital. The low wage rate growth in the US may be a reflection more
of a stratified labor market than of the human capital return. The unskilled wage growth
rate should reflect productivity gains. But the Central European productivity gains likely
also result from more jumps in human capital to higher skill levels.
A step further than examining the marginal factor products that is not investigated
here is to examine how transition country business cycle facts compare to international
evidence. The literature on international real business cycles details how various
aggregates co-move with output [Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1995; Cooley and
Hansen, 1995]. Table 3 shows real output and the correlation amongst countries. There
is a high positive correlation amongst the US, Germany, Poland, Czech, and Slovenia,
while Hungary and Romania move opposite of the US. Germany moves most closely with
Poland and Czech, and opposite of Hungary. Opposite movements within an integrated
market are explained in the business cycle literature by shocks to technology specific to
the particular country or industry. For example, this suggests that Hungary may be
specializing in industry that is not as pronounced in Germany.
Business cycle evidence generally includes a procyclical real interest rate and a
possibly procyclical real wage. The degree to which transition countries are found to fall
within the range of evidence would suggest a degree of integration in world markets, and
would reflect some degree of market stability. Table 3, using the real interest data from
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There is a higher correlation of the Polish real interest rate and US GDP; a slight negative
correlation of the Hungarian real interest rate and US GDP; and a strong negative
correlation of the German real interest rate and US GDP .
2.2. Endogenous Growth and Taxes
The marginal factor prices and the business cycle evidence can suggest some degree of
market integration. They are indicators of the health of private markets which governments
support and constrain, and only indirectly reflect government policy. The other such key
indicator is the growth rate of real GDP . Endogenous growth theory tells us that the
balanced-growth rate of output equals the amount that the marginal product of capital
(physical or human) exceeds the Fisherian rate of time preference, normalized by a
coefficient for the preference for intertemporal substitution, generally taken to be between
1 and 2. Thus with the same preference parameters, nations have output growth rate
differentials determined by differences in their marginal product of capital [1].
Table 4 shows the growth rates amongst several Central European nations and
Germany and the US, and the correlation between the growth rate and real interest rate
of each country. Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia show such a positive correlation
between real interest rates and output growth rates, although Czech and the US show a
negative correlation.
Endogenous growth theory also emphasizes that it is the net marginal product of
capital, net of marginal taxes on capital, that determines the growth rate. Thus the tax
burdens of nations should negatively affect the growth rates. Recent extensions of this
growth theory to a monetary setting finds the same kind of negative growth effect from
the inflation tax. The inflation rate acts on exchange and induces greater substitution on
leisure. And greater leisure use induces a lower return on human capital. These taxes are
a more direct gauge of government action.
Table 5 shows the total revenue as a share of GDP . This captures not only the average
tax rate but also includes other items such as asset sales from privatization efforts.
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia show similar levels and gradual declines in the levels.
Czech and Germany are at similar levels but Czech shows a declining trend, and Germany
10
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[1]  See de Gregoria (1996), Fisher (1993), Bruno and Easterly (1998), Gomme (1993), Ireland (1994),
Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1996), Jones and Rossi (1993), Gillman et al (1999), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), and
Wu and Zhang (1998).a rising trend. The US share has been low and relatively stable, while Romanias share has
dropped to a level below that of Czech. Hungary and Romania show the most variability.
Table 6 shows the share of the increase in base money in total GDP , where base
money is defined as reserves plus currency. The mean and standard deviation consistently
move together across the sample. Both are highest in Hungary and Romania, and about
half those numbers in Poland. Czech, Germany, Slovenia, and the US have means near
1% with low variability.
Table 7 shows the inflation rates, defined as the percentage change in the Consumer
Price Index, across a larger sample of Central European nations and Germany and the US,
ranked according to mean across disparate years as data allows. Again is the striking
relation between the level of the mean and the level of the variance; they rise together
uniformily, except for the US and Czech, across the sample countries. Generally the
countries in Table 7a are subject to analysis because they have relatively stable inflations.
But after Slovenia, the countries in Table 7b historically have such high and variable
inflation rates, that the real interest rate is often negative, a reflection of de facto debt
repudiation, and the investment climate consequently is poor in terms of integration in
the capital markets. Recently the inflation rates have come way down to low steady levels
in Croatia and Latvia, and to somewhat higher levels in Ukraine and Russia.
A consequence of high inflation rates can be lower growth rates of GDP . This is
supported in endogenous growth theory and in empirical studies [Gillman et al, 1999,
de Gregoria, 1996]. Table 8 shows the correlation of inflation rates and GDP growth
rates for the sample of countries found in Table 4. The evidence shows a strong
negative correlation for Poland, Hungary, the US, and Czech, a slight negative effect
for Romania, a slight positive effect for Germany, and a strong positive correlation for
Slovenia. The literature on the growth-inflation effect has identified a negative non-
linear effect, whereby the negative correlation is stronger at low inflation levels than
at high ones. The lower level of the negative effect for Romania compared to the
higher levels of the negative effect for Poland, Hungary, and the US is consistent with
these results.
2.3. Debt
Considering inflation rates as summary evidence of the monetary policy, the summary
measure for fiscal policy often is taken to be government debt levels relative to GDP .
Some literature views debt as a something of a free ride, in the sense that we do not have
to worry about debt at all, as in traditional IS-LM models. More neoclassically, we can
build overlapping generations economies in which debt increases net wealth because the
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burden of repayment is put more heavily on unborn generations that have no weight in
the utility function that is maximized [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996]. As a counter to such
thinking, the Barro-Ricardo logic makes debt merely a set of future tax payments that
dynastic-family utility functions fully include. Indeed it is the unfunded entitlement
programs that cause such onerous marginal wage tax rates in Eastern European countries
that have inherited a legacy of massive communist era social welfare programs.
When debt is focused upon it is usually in the context of its magnitude relative to national
output, making the debt/GDP measure a combination of government and private sector
activity [2]. Table 9 shows the debt/GDP for Central European nations plus Germany and the
US from 19891997, as IMF data is available. The small and shrinking Czech debt is notable,
as is the rising Romanian debt. Germany and Slovenia also show rising levels while Hungary
and the US exhibit a rising and falling trend. It is difficult to make much more out of such
numbers by themselves. But one important consideration suggested by the evidence, in light
of other evidence on growth rates and marginal products, is that different governments may
in effect be choosing different positions on a risk-yield frontier, in the sense of the capital
asset pricing tradeoff. Certainly, Hungary with the highest debt ratio seems not exceedingly
more likely to default than Czech with the lowest debt ratio. But at the same time, the yield
to governments, if measured by the increase in taxes from economic expansion, is higher in
Hungary with its high growth rate than in Czech with its low growth rate.
Table 10 compares, for low inflation countries, their mean debt/GDP for 19941997
their GDP growth rates for 19941998. There is some sense in which the higher debt
counties of US, Poland, and Hungary have had higher growth rates that Germany and Czech,
suggesting a lower risk, lower yield preference for Germany and Czech. However from this
perspective, Slovenia is an outlier. This may be because of its capital restrictions, or because
the debt/GDP is a mixed measure of private and government activity, rather than a measure
of only government activity as would be desired for applying a risk-yield framework.
3. A Measure of a Governments Debt-equity Ratio
Private firms choose how risky they want their finance structure to be. Highly
leveraged, with a high debt-equity ratio and seeking a high growth rate of return, or less
highly leveraged, with possibly a more stable but lower yield. The market uses the debt-
[2] A countrys level of international reserves is sometimes cited as evidence about the strength of
government finances. Certainly with fixed exchange rates, international reserves are necessary to support an
overvalued currency.equity ratio in part in evaluating the risk of default by firms, since when the company is
highly leveraged, the contractual interest payments on debt are large relative to the non-
contractual dividend payments on equity ownership. A downturn in revenue creates a
greater likelihood of default in a more highly leveraged firm. 
For evaluation of the risk of government finance, the debt/GDP measure is related to
the concept of a debt-equity ratio, but requires some additional assumptions to view it in
this way. A benefit of the extension of the debt/GDP measure to a perspective of the
debt-equity ratio is a broader way to evaluate directly the government policy of transition
countries, in which default is possible.
A federal government like a private firm has two basic means of external finance:
borrowing through debt and selling equity.  When IBM sells debt, it is limited by wanting
to avoid having high contractual interest payments that risk default. When IBM sells equity
stock to raise capital, it is limited by wanting to avoid "diluting" the unit share value of the
stock. This share circulates in a secondary market but has no other value than the financial
yield to investors. When the government sells debt, it faces the same limit of wanting to
avoid high contractual interest payments that are too high relative to a downturn in tax
payments plus seignoirage, since this also risks default. The difference between private
and public finance relates mainly to its equity shares. The government "sells" its equity
when it buys goods and services with freshly printed money. The stock of fiat money has
no par value, similar to the unit equity share of a firm, in that it cannot be converted into
anything else like gold, as with commodity money. Fiat money has no debt features. And
its value is diluted when the government issues more of it, like private equity. As long as
IBM issues equity at a rate below the rate of demand for its equity, the unit share price
will keep rising. Likewise the governments fiat will depreciate in value only if its issuance
exceeds in rate of growth the demand. However, unlike IBMs stock, the governments
fiat serves also as a means of exchange. If Panama became a "dollarized" with IBM stock
instead of U.S. currency, then IBM would enjoy an additional demand for its equity
beyond its rate of return, and IBM would reap seignoirage: it could issue more without
dilution of its equity value. So this is the main difference in the equity finance. The
governments fiat enjoys the additional transactions demand. In addition, the government
can induce differential default on its debt, without a court system of bankruptcy
restructuring of debt as with private firms, through unexpectedly high money printing and
inflation (equity dilution) that breaks the implicit contract of paying a certain real interest
rate on its debt.
Government revenues are mainly its tax receipts, from all sources plus asset sales for
example through privatization. Its issuance of money also adds to its capital. And from
here we can define a notion of the equity value, or net worth, of the government, not an
obviously well-defined concept. First, to define the asset value of the government, we
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as for a private firm. But then what are the profits for a government? In a sense they are
the new taxes generated (or lost) plus seignoirage by having set and enforced the
property rights covering markets such that the markets could expand (or contract). With
an economy growing, markets expand, taxes increase, and the government reaps this
tribute in return for supplying the flow of services in the form of defining property rights. 
Assuming that the government reinvests all profits, then all past incremental
increases in the economys output and taxes, carried forward without interest, are
captured by the current tax revenues expected at the end of the year. And the future
increase in taxes is captured by the future increase in output, factored by the average
tax rate. This suggests that the current and future discounted tax revenues plus
seignoirage can be defined as the asset value of the government. The real discount rate,
denoted r, for such future tax revenues from the expansion of the economy should be
the risk-free real interest rate, denoted rf, plus a premium, denoted p, for the degree
of inefficiency with which the government uses the new taxes to maintain or improve
its services; or r º  rf + p. This interest rate will simply be measured by the real interest
rate in the economy, where the particular market rate will be chosen as a retail rather
than wholesale rate so as to be more likely to include the full premium. The revenue
at time t can be expressed as the average federal tax rate t factored by the real output
yt, plus the rate of growth of the money stock s factored by the real money supply,
denoted here by mt º Mt/Pt, where M is the nominal money stock and P the aggregate
price level. Assuming constant average tax, money supply growth, and real interest
rates, then the infinite discounted stream is
Assuming real output and real money demand grow at constant rate g, this asset value
equals
The equity value at time t, denoted et, of the federal government can then be defined
as the asset value minus the real debt at time t, denoted dt:
14














+ + + + +
3
2 t 2 t
2











g) 1 m y
r) 1
g) 1 m y
r 1
















+ ) s t (
...
(
)( s t (
(
)( s t ( ) s t (





t - - º º
) s t ( +And the debt-equity ratio is given by 
Defining velocity v as the ratio of real output to real money, or vt º yt / mt the inverse
equity-debt ratio can be written as a function of the debt-output ratio, velocity and the
other parameters:
(1)
The equity-debt ratio depends negatively on the debt-output ratio, the money
velocity, and the real interest rate, and positively on the average tax, money supply
growth and output growth rates. Given computation of real interest rate, data exists so
that this can be readily computed for any country. Note that
s/v = sM/Y = (DM/M) M/Y = DM/Y
where M and Y are the nominal base money stock and nominal income, so that this
can be measured by the increase in the nominal base money relative to nominal GDP , as
in Table 6.
4. Empirical Estimation of the Debt-equity Ratios
Calculation of the Debt/Equity ratios in Table 11 below uses the IMF data of the
Tables 1, 4, 5, 6, and 10, for the real interest rate, the growth rate of GDP , the share of
taxes (revenue) in GDP , the change in the money base relative to GDP , and the debt/GDP
ratio. As with debt/GDP ratios, the evidence here shows a sense in which the low growth
rate countries of Czech and Germany have the low debt/equity ratios compared to the
high growth rate countries with higher debt/equity ratios. But now Slovenia, which has a
low debt/GDP ratio but a high growth rate, fits in the high debt/equity, high growth group
of countries rather than being an outlier as in the debt/GDP comparison of risk/yield. We
also find that the variability of the debt/equity ratio rises with the mean across countries
in an unbroken pattern, thereby exhibiting greater monotonicity in this than the inflation
rate data.
Can anything be said about the levels of the debt/equity ratio? Consider some private
corporation examples for comparison. From 1991 to 1998 the high growth Intel
15
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 156  Evaluating Government ...















) s t (
.    1











) / s t (Corporation had long term debt equity ratios as in Table 12. These are of a low level
comparable to the governments of countries in Table 11. Another corporation, IBM, had
a debt-equity ratio of 1.5 in 1998, considerably higher, and private corporations often
have such ratios above 1. Using revenues as the profit stream in the government debt-
equity ratio arguably makes the levels low compared to private corporations. But with a
consistent methodology, countries still can be compared on this basis to each other, and
the evidence suggests the possibility of using a framework of risk-yield tradeoffs.
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5. Evaluation of Changes in the Debt-equity Ratio
Applying the concept of yield-risk to gauge government policy does not imply that
high debt is necessarily good because it guarantees high yield, although if along the
efficiency frontier, it may lead to higher, albeit possibly more variable, GDP growth. The
government may not be close to the efficiency frontier at which the yield-risk tradeoff is
optimally chosen as a result of tangency between preferences and the production
possibility curve that uncertainly transforms current social capital into future social capital
at some risk. The process of getting to the efficient frontier is a major dilemma for
transition countries. This is done by more efficiently transforming government revenues
into a flow of property rights services, in particular with respect to the communist-era
social welfare entitlements for health, pensions, education, disability, and the ill-defined
and enforced tax base.
On a gradual approach to a reasonable policy that can be roughly considered along
the efficiency frontier, policy tensions can arise when attempting to decrease the
debt/equity ratio. Increasing hear-horizon revenues through higher marginal tax rates
may sacrifice future tax revenues because of lower economic growth. Similarly increasing
the tax base without lowering the marginal rates would raise the effective marginal rates
and also sacrifice growth. Relying on high seignoirage requires high inflation rates and
recent research indicates that this is an inefficient form of taxation relative to factor and
consumption taxes [Lucas, 1993; Aiyagari et al, 1998]. 
Raising tax and inflation rates increases the liquidity perhaps in the short run, but
increases avoidance, decreases the tax base, lowers economic growth, and decreases
the future stream of taxes. The ability of the government to pay interest payments on
debt through tax revenues is the way in which the concept of "Ricardian equivalence"
is manifest [see Barro, 1990]. However the subtext of the practice of such equivalence
16
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cost in terms of decreased economic growth. This hidden feature of Ricardian
equivalence creates perhaps the central problem of a high debt-equity ratio:
liquidating the future growth of the economy through higher marginal tax rates helps
avoid insolvency at the cost of lower net worth, and a higher expected future debt-
equity ratio. Thus as the debt-equity ratio is analyzed, a look at the pace of changes in
the quality of government spending and in the marginal tax rates, including inflation
rates, gives an indication of the likely future debt-equity ratio.
6. Qualifications and Conclusions
The data set used is for illustrative purposes. Using the International Financial
Statistics has the advantage of a well-screened data set that is comparable across
countries, but has disadvantage of missing data points. As no econometric analysis has
been performed on the data set, and as the missing data points are clearly identified in
the tables, it is clear that the results are discussed given these limitations. Filling in missing
points with less internationally accepted data may be possible, but does introduce less
confidence in the consistency of the data set taken as a whole.
The paper finds a certain risk-yield tradeoff in the cross-country comparison of the
calibrated debt-equity ratios and the growth rates of GDP . This is robust to some changes
in the data years used, and the countries were selected in a non-biased way based on
whether a debt-equity ratio could be computed. For example, while almost having
enough data for Romania, some key data, necessary for computation of the debt-equity
ratio, were missing and could not be filled in from national accounts data. As this is a first
postulation of the theoretical concept of a debt-equity ratio as applied above to
governments, the data succeeded in illustrating how the concept can be used to interpret
a broad measure of government performance in Central European countries. And the
data shows how these countries can be compared to Western economies in this measure.
Further work to extend the data base across years, countries, and regions would be
interesting.
The concept of the debt-equity ratio brings together how the central dilemmas of
governments are resolved in terms of the need for to raise capital, the efficacy of how it
is raised, and the effectiveness with which it is invested. It offers an alternative summary
measure related to older discussions of macroeconomic tradeoffs and of the industrial
policy of the government. It is in place of the 1960s type discussions of taking a position
of a certain inflation-unemployment equilibrium along a supposedly stable Phillips curve,
17
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actively participating in supporting industries in some type of industrial policy, which
turned out to be an international set of weak private bank loans. The concept here
merges these under the 1990s type emphasis on microeconomic reform that leads to
more efficient markets and more effective government policy.  In this the capital of the
government is viewed as is the capital of the finance theory of private firms. This views
efficient governments as taking a position along the central finance tradeoff of risk and
yield, as dependent on their national cultures or preferences. It views inefficient
governments in terms of whether they are moving towards such an efficiency frontier.
And it views the investment of international capital markets as diversifying across
idiosyncratic risks that are systemic to a country or a region in part because of the
particular risk-yield tradeoff taken by the government of that country or region. 
18
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Real Interest
Rate
Czech Germany Hungary Poland Slovenia US




1991 0.066 0.009 0.043 0.085
1992 0.069 0.102 0.113 0.063
1993 0.031 0.063 0.030 0.031 0.060
1994 0.037 0.062 0.085 0.027 0.212 0.071
1995 0.037 0.048 0.043 0.080 0.106 0.088
1996 0.048 0.060 0.038 0.129 0.158 0.083
1997 0.040 0.035 0.139 0.084
Mean 0.038 0.060 0.049 0.070 0.154 0.079
Standard  deviation 0.007 0.011 0.033 0.044 0.044 0.014
Correlation  with
US
0.67 -0.14 -0.52 0.20 -0.98 1.00
Table 1.
% change  in Czech Germany Hungary Poland Slovenia US
Real Wage (Wage Index /PPI)
1991 4.50 -6.50 11.20 3.10
1992 5.30 8.10 7.00 1.80
1993 5.50 7.00 5.90 24.50 1.00
1994 1.00 1.20 8.90 1.40
1995 10.10 12.60 5.20 -1.00
1996 13.20 11.60 7.50 1.00
1997 12.80 5.00 3.00
Mean 12.03 4.08 2.87 8.25 10.22 1.47
Standard  deviation 1.38 2.10 8.13 4.37 8.15 1.39
Table 2. Percentage Change in Real Wage22
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Real GDP
US Slovenia Romania Poland Hungary Germany Czech
1989 5697.4 2297.3
1990 5743.8 857.9 2089.3 2429.4
1991 5687.9 747.2 457.74 1840.7 2750.6
1992 5842.7 646 447.6 1784.4 2811.1
1993 5973.1 174.3 655.1 443.19 1774.1 2778.5 498.7
1994 6183.6 183.6 681.1 449.2 1826.4 2858 514.7
1995 6308.4 191.1 486.11 1853.6 2913.7 547.4
1996 6544.8 197 508.5 2952.4 568.9
1997 6802.1 204.4 3012 574.4
Correlation  of Real GDP
US Slovenia Romania Poland Hungary Germany Czech
US 1.00 0.99 -0.56 0.79 -0.32 0.77 0.95
Slovenia 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.98
Romania -0.56 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.96 -0.92 1.00
Poland 0.79 0.95 0.93 1.00 0.79 0.99 0.99
Hungary -0.32 0.99 0.96 0.79 1.00 -0.86 0.93
Germany 0.77 1.00 -0.92 0.99 -0.86 1.00 0.97
Czech 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.97 1.00
Corr.  of Real Interest  Rate
with US GDP 0.09 -0.37 0.43 -0.09 -0.86 0.97
Table 3. Real GDP and its Correlation23
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Growth  Rate of Czech Germany Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia US
Real GDP
1990 0.058 0.008
1991 0.132 -0.119 -0.183 -0.010
1992 0.022 -0.031 -0.022 -0.135 0.027
1993 -0.012 -0.006 -0.010 0.014 0.022
1994 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.014 0.040 0.053 0.035
1995 0.064 0.019 0.015 0.082 0.041 0.020
1996 0.039 0.013 0.013* 0.046 0.031 0.037
1997 0.010 0.020 0.044 0.069 -0.066 0.038 0.039
1998 -0.027 0.051 0.048 -0.073 0.042
Mean 0.024 0.035 -0.002 0.006 -0.044 0.041 0.022
Standard
deviation
0.034 0.044 0.059 0.084 0.071 0.008 0.017
Correlation  of own real Int rt, grth rt.
-0.29 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.57 -0.33
Table 4. Growth Rate of GDP
* Hungarian Central Statistical Office
199798: Central European Economic Review, Vol VII No.424
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Czech Germany Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia US
Change  in Base  Money/GDP
1990 0.016 0.009
1991 0.010 0.130 0.051 0.077 0.006
1992 0.022 0.051 0.053 0.121 0.008
1993 0.002 0.051 0.021 0.088 0.010
1994 0.021 0.003 0.043 0.028 0.059 0.024 0.010
1995 0.015 0.005 0.069 0.056 0.051 0.015 0.005
1996 0.010 0.007 0.027 0.043 0.009 0.006
1997 0.000 -0.001 0.035 0.065 0.013 0.009
Mean 0.012 0.008 0.069 0.039 0.072 0.015 0.008
Standard
deviation
0.009 0.008 0.036 0.014 0.026 0.006 0.002
Table 6. Change in Base Money Relative to GDP
Revenue/GDP Czech Germany Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia US
1989 0.296 0.183
1990 0.289 0.529 0.347 0.183
1991 0.285 0.509 0.373 0.179
1992 0.317 0.480 0.365 0.176
1993 0.348 0.318 0.484 0.319 0.426 0.179
1994 0.332 0.326 0.478 0.419 0.299 0.415 0.184
1995 0.327 0.323 0.430 0.409 0.296 0.417 0.188
1996 0.311 0.316 0.425 0.398 0.279 0.408 0.192
1997 0.304 0.320 0.388 0.400 0.200
Mean 0.324 0.310 0.476 0.404 0.325 0.413 0.185
Standard
deviation
0.017 0.016 0.038 0.013 0.037 0.010 0.007
Table 5. Revenue as a Share of GDP25
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Germany US Slovakia CzechRep Moldova Hungary Poland
Inflation  Rates
1991 3.64 4.23 34.23 76.71
1992 5.06 3.03 22.95 45.33
1993 4.46 2.95 22.45 36.87
1994 2.73 2.61 13.41 10.06 18.87 33.25
1995 1.84 2.81 9.89 9.10 12.07 28.30 26.80
1996 1.49 2.93 5.81 8.82 22.12 23.49 20.15
1997 1.75 2.34 6.11 8.45 10.96 18.28 15.91
1998 0.29 1.61 6.80 10.80 14.30 11.80
Mean 2.66 2.81 8.40 9.45 15.05 22.86 33.35
Standard
deviation
1.62 0.74 3.23 0.96 6.15 6.21 20.78
Table 7a. Inflation Rate
Slovenia Latvia Romania Bulgaria Russia Croatia Ukraine
Inflation  Rates
1991 230.62 122.22
1992 156.62 243.27 211.21 91.30 632.50
1993 31.90 108.77 255.17 72.88 874.62 1483.62 4734.91
1994 19.77 35.93 136.76 96.06 307.38 107.33 891.19
1995 12.63 24.98 32.24 62.05 197.41 3.95 376.75
1996 9.68 17.61 38.83 123.01 47.57 4.34 80.33
1997 9.09 8.45 154.76 1082.26 14.62 4.13 15.94
1998 8.00 4.70 64.00 46.20 27.60 5.70 10.50
Mean 35.38 63.39 140.45 224.82 244.87 295.47 1018.27
Standard
deviation
54.12 86.80 88.15 378.92 329.21 524.99 1851.55
Table 7b. Inflation Rate26
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Correlation  of Annual  Growth  Rate of GDP  and Inflation  Rate for 1990  1998
Czech Germany Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia US
-0.557 0.080 -0.858 -0.946 -0.113 0.799 -0.764
Table 8. Growth-Inflation Effects  
Debt/GDP Czech Germany Hungary Poland Romania* Slovenia US
1989 0.224 0.413
1990 0.247 0.444
1991 0.239 0.741 0.481
1992 0.261 0.785 0.150 0.503
1993 0.159 0.286 0.897 0.140 0.517
1994 0.141 0.302 0.871 0.723 0.170 0.154 0.510
1995 0.114 0.373 0.860 0.579 0.180 0.168 0.507
1996 0.101 0.388 0.724 0.511 0.230 0.222 0.499
1997 0.101 0.390 0.480 0.330 0.241 0.474
Mean 0.123 0.301 0.813 0.573 0.200 0.196 0.483
Stnd dev 0.026 0.066 0.073 0.108 0.071 0.042 0.035
Table 9. Debt to GDP Ratios
Mean Czech Slovenia Germany US Poland Hungary
Debt/GDP,
1994  97
0.114 0.196 0.363 0.498 0.573 0.818
Gr Rt GDP,
1994  98
0.024 0.041 0.020 0.033 0.052 0.035
Table 10. Debt/GDP and Growth Rate of GDP: Risk-Yield Tradeoff?
From data in Tables 4 and 7, plus the inflation rates in 1990 for Germany and the US of 0.027 and 0.054
respectively
*Data for Romania from Siwinska (1999)27
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Debt/Equity Czech Germany Poland Slovenia Hungary US
1990 0.012 0.268
1991 -0.050 0.174 0.325
1992 0.043 0.243 0.106
1993 0.067 0.063 0.115
1994 0.019 0.033 0.125 0.103 0.105
1995 -0.004 0.034 0.053 0.051 0.216
1996 0.013 0.058 0.157 0.128
1997 0.025 0.025 0.111 0.134 0.114
Mean 0.013 0.043 0.111 0.117 0.146 0.172
Stnd.
Deviation
0.013 0.036 0.000 0.045 0.081 0.086
Gr Rt GDP,
1994  98
0.024 0.020 0.052 0.041 0.035 0.033
Table 11. Debt to Equity Ratios
INTEL CORPORATION:  Debt-equity  ratios, 199198
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
0.079 0.111 0.133 0.111 0.083 0.059 0.130 0.039
Table 12. Intel Corporation
Mean 0.093, Stnd. Dev. 0.03428
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